



Who's upsetting who? Memory, nostalgia, morality 
Gillian Cowlishaw  
 
I am billed as one with expertise in race relations — perhaps already an example of naming 
something that we have difficulty naming. In contemporary multi-cultural Australia we all have 
direct experience of race relations — many of you will have more intimate and more recent 
experience in the NT than I do. I look forward to your responses to what I have to say. 
I like to think of race relations as a borderland which exists anywhere that there is 
interaction between Indigenous and settler or immigrant Australians — including in our 
imaginations. That is, in imagining others to be strange, we imagine ourselves to share a 
common not-strangeness with those of our own kind, but that category, 'our own kind', can itself 
be narrow or broad, depending on the circumstances. 
Race relations also includes governments' policies, the bureaucracy, state institutions and 
the law, but today I will concentrate on the micro level, actual encounters between people who 
see themselves as belonging to two different races. Such encounters are often bizarre or painful, 
ludicrous or touching. The question I am posing is "What is it in Australian social life, 
particularly in the Northern Territory that so often precludes closer interaction and 
pleasure in difference?". 
Race relations is also a space of deplored difference, of shameful inequality, ostensibly a 
source of anxiety and mourning to the nation. The convention of announcing the terrible poverty, 
injustice and 3rd world conditions of Aboriginal people stands in for a more direct engagement 
with actual people.1 (eg. the journalist who bemoans the living conditions of artists in remote 
communities whose work fetches huge sums, is repeating a cliché rather than thinking through 
the different desires, priorities, social conditions and histories of these artists). 
The term racism has become a cliché but let us admit that, despite it being carefully 
suppressed among modern, cosmopolitan citizens, racism, intolerance and bigotry are things we 
all know about, a common, banal aspect of human experience, evident in the tendency to 
stereotype and in a common wariness or suspicion of 'strange' people. But what is the 
relationship of these negative sentiments to the actual difficulties of different kinds of people, 
with different kinds of habits living close by one another. Such difficulties are a space of fear 
and silence because we are supposed to celebrate difference in all an any of its manifestations. It 
is this orthodoxy I want to examine first. (Of course difficult differences of life-style are 
                                                 
1  I use the idea of 'vernacular debate' in the same sense Alan Atkinson (2002)  uses 'vernacular history' as that which 




experienced within cultural or racial groups, even within families, as those with teenaged 
children will know). 
I am recommending that we (anthropologists) turn the analytical anthropological eye onto 
the relationship between whitefellas and blackfellas. But we need to begin with interaction 
among whitefellas, and even within the category of people to which we belong, the mostly 
urban, educated middle class. Where better to begin than at the dinner party, that quintessential 
ritual of urban social life, and as good a place as any to observe the role played by Aborigines 
in the urban imagination. 
 
A. URBAN CONVERSATIONS 
Dinner parties exibit a host of rituals with informal, pragmatic rules. While the people who 
participate are enormously varied in their views, the dinner party is dominated by the need to 
make conversation without too much contention — though some mild disagreement can add 
spice to the gathering. To ensures that dinner parties are not marred by serious conflict, a form of 
categorisation is practiced and the idea of Aborigines plays an important role in this process by 
signalling a certain political position in 'vernacular political debate.'2 
There is a shared national anxiety about Aborigines, but the opinion categories concerning 
this topic are radically dichotomised in what is known as the left/right divide — creating a  moral 
and political binarism where everyone is forced to participate on one side or another of an arena 
that is already laid out.3 We are enticed into affirming 'common sense' pieties or remaining 
silent. The intensity of emotion surrounding these opinions belie a level of personal meaning 
outside political loyalties. It is instructive to note what happens when dinner party guests do not 
share an opinion category. (always the ethnographer). 
Dinner party 1 was in the private home of an aquaintance. When another guest was told I 
wrote about Aborigines, she pounced on me to ask "why do they sit around with flies in their 
eyes; I've seen them on the TV. We spend all that money; but they want to keep their 
traditions don’t they?" I began to reply but my voice registers a note of anger, and perhaps 
contempt, so I was hushed and the subject was changed. I am not discussing how to respond to 
                                                 
2  I am suggesting that a conversational analysis equivalent but different from that made famous by Harvey Sacks 
(REF). 
 
3  The dichotomy makes no sense from the point of view of rural Aboriginal people because both sides seem 
oblivious of Aboriginal existance. The dichotomy is problematised in a more direct way when Aborigines joke 
about sympathetic white opinion as hypocritical, or express support for Pauline Hanson's criticisms of government 
policy. The history wars debatees exemplify this field of opinion which I suggest has a structure and dynamic that is 
identifiable in technical terms. One position is characterised by the expression of sympathy and the other side by 
criticisism of that sympathy. I want to suggest that neither have much sense of the effect of the new history, 




such commonplace comments — although there is a certain pleasure in competing for the most 
withering response. I am more interested in their ordinariness, and, in a sense, their naturalness, 
given the social imaginary they are part of. And yet they arouse a kind of fury in people like 
myself. And they stand in stark contrast to the goodwill, solicitude and careful avoidance of 
criticism which characterises conversation at the dinner parties I am usually fated to attend. 
Dinner party 2 was a large social function in Sydney where lawyers and academics were  
gathered.4 When the conversation touched on Aboriginal disadvantage there was a general 
expression of sympathy. But a woman of immigrant background insisted on recounting her own 
triumph over deprivation as an explicit criticism of the company’s sympathy for Aborigines’ 
plight. With confused lowering of eyes the subject was changed and the woman was frozen out 
of the conversation. Here a tentative questioning of the prevailing orthodoxy was met with 
shocked disapproval, and conversational embarrassment. I tried to respond, not just because I 
find conflict stimulating, but because I felt some sympathy with this woman's sentiments — not I 
hasten to add, her implied criticism of Aboriginal people, but her challenge to the orthodox 
sympathy which was being expressed independently of any experience or knowledge of 
Indigenous people. This pious orthodoxy seems to me damaging to Aboriginal interests, because 
it imagines Aboriginal people to be simply victims, objects of our sympathy. 
At Dinner party 3 everyone understands that Aborigines are victims of injustice, and 
wants to demonstrate understanding. I mention to a colleague that Aborigines in Bourke mock 
and amplify their own stereotypes, and that street disturbances might be a kind of protest and he 
says ‘of course they are’, applauding the idea of outrageous behaviour and protest. But when I 
speak of going to the rough pub in Bourke he says ‘But is it safe?’ and finally, nervously, ‘You 
don’t want a bottle in your face’. 
In all these cases speaking of Aborigines has a certain familiarity and confidence. 
These are indeed 'our Aborigines', part of our responsibility, especially to have opinions about. 
Thus Aboriginal issues work as an identifier of an opinion category which is an important part of 
group formation. Seeking of compatible opinions is a ‘rule of conversation’ and part of a wider 
process of indentifying those we are like, and those we like, within a social geography. 
The offensiveness of others' political opinions is palpable, as in your reaction to the woman 
I quoted above.5 One part of the impulsive response may be to protect Aboriginal people 
                                                 
4  This is an example of the signalling of an 'opinion category'. 
 
5  Conversational conventions, both public and intimate, can break down in the face of wrong opinion although the 
rules are different among strangers from those among intimates. Public issues, such as the Tampa crisis, the war in 
Iraq, or years ago, support for Mao Tse Tung, and always, opinions about Indigenous issues, has divided families 




from this woman's offensive opinion, because we understand only too well the contempt 
implied by such comments  — yet from another perspective, sitting in the dirt is actually sitting 
on the land, interacting with country, of which flies are a part. 
But another part of the impulsive angry reaction to such opinion is to do with 
protecting ourselves from conflict and from social discomfort.  By aligning of ourselves with 
conventional political or moral positions, we are affirming our own rightness, normality, social 
safety. Our shared social honour entails being contemptuous of those with wrong opinions, yet 
the obsession with those who are wrong or racist itself binds us into our cultural comfort zone. 
If the very idea of Aborigines, or 'others' in general, is a site of such intense moral feeling, 
fear and self-definition, then it is not surprising that actual face to face relationships between 
Aborigines and whitefellas are somewhat difficult. 
 
B. CULTURAL EMBARRASSMENT  
In face to face encounters with people who are radically, or noticably or publically 
different from prevailing norms, we make impulsive judgements which are, of course, an 
element of race relations. Among progressivists it is usual to profess an acceptance of 
difference and to suppress any judgement, to censor any disapproval of the cultural 
practices of others. Yet unadmitted disapproval, bafflement or fear can be a powerful barrier to 
understanding difference. Impulsive, moralising responses — for instance to public displays of 
poverty, or of anger, or public disorder — are part of what has produced the complex social 
reality before us. The censoring and self-censoring of impulsive judgements operates to protect 
us from thinking about what produces and reproduces conflict over public space. 
Let us, then, depart from the dinner party mileau and enter public space, as I did  when I 
arrived in Katherine in 1975. Katherine was to me shockingly racialised. Aborigines appeared 
quite outside the social life of the dusty little town, yet an essential part of it. The black bodies 
sitting on the bright green nature strip in family groups seemed like exotic decorations. Once I 
began field-work among the Rembarrnga people at Bulman (200 Ks east) I avoided whitefellas, 
because interaction with my own kind became difficult and often embarrassing. The experience 
of that excruciating embarrassment is, I believe, illuminating.6 
For instance, one day I was sitting on the nature strip with my Bulman friends, Lorna, 
Dorothy, Smiler, Michelle and several other kids, a well-dressed, middle aged English couple 
approached me as if the others were not there and said: "Excuse me, do you mind if we ask. Was 
that material of your dress made by these native people?" With Michelle dissolving in giggles 
                                                 




behind me, and the older women still and silent, I explained that it was an Indian print, bought in 
a store across the road.  
Similarly, and frequently white people would ask questions as if I was one of them, and my 
black companions were not sentient beings. eg. 'Do you think there is a solution to the 
Aboriginal problem?'. We were assumed to have a common interest in Rembarrnga people as 
objects, as conversational resources, and as problems for the nation. They were 'the white man's 
burden', but because these burdens had become my friends on whom I was dependent for 
everyday interaction and support, I became acutely aware that the virtuous concerns of my 
fellow whitefellas actively excluded the subjectivities of those who they were supposedly 
concerned about. 
- The Rembarrnga view of whitefellas was informed by quite different assumptions. An 
everyday example was 12 year old Michelle's response when I chatted to a young white shop 
assistant in Katherine. Michelle asked in awe, 'Mula, is he your cousin?', that being the only 
explanation she could think of for the friendly joking interaction she had observed. And 
Rembarrnga people often put a question to me which I found hard to answer "If you interact with 
strangers, how do you know which people you should not marry?" Most of you will understand 
that,  for many Aboriginal people, the all-embracing kinship system identifies those people who 
one can and cannot marry. The possibility of unknowingly entering incestuous relationships 
seemed to my Rembarrnga friends a source of alarm. This is one of many ways the whitefella's 
cultural realm is baffling to Rembarrnga, just as their realm often is to whites. But of course, it is 
they who are forced to become aware of whitefellas rules rather than vice versa. It is they who 
learned to use English, and money, and to understand private property.7 
- Another time I was on my own in the Katherine main street and I nervously noticed a 
dishevelled drunken black man coming towards me, staggering a bit. He saw me and, just as I 
recognised him, he shouted, 'Mula, I'm sick Mummy. I bin drink too much' and he flung his arms 
around me and asked me to take him home. It was one of the men from Bulman who had become 
my putative son as a consequence of the place I'd been assigned in the kinship system. I was both 
moved and interested in this man's trust in me. I had not been long in the community and had not 
had a lot to do with him. But because I was Ngaritjan and he was Gamerang, he knew I would 
look after him in his distress. Thus I learned something about my own emotional reactions and 
                                                 
7  I do not want to reproduce the kind of generalised moralism that often stands in for thinking about how difference 
is experienced, but perhaps I can comment that Aborigines have had to learn to operate within a culture dominated 
by an economy and political institutions which were morally repugnant because based on an individulism which 




something about the ubiquity of kinship and its obligations and that these mutual obligations 
were assumed to extend across the racial divide. 
These incidents are tiny examples of the constant indications in everyday life of the 
presence of two sets of assumptions about how to live, held by people who are in fact, living side 
by side and in the same geographical spaces. We all know this familiar situation as colonialism, 
but such a term sheds no light on the experiences of interaction and does not assist in coping 
with radical difference. I found it a surprisingly liberating experience to be able to open my arms 
to the a stereotypical drunken blackfella, who was also a young friend who called me Mummy, 
and to take him to my car to sleep off the drink. Later he was embarrassed and ashamed, 
although I tried to explain to him that he'd done me a favour in forcing me to think beyond 
images of the drunken blackfella to the men and women who are trying to come to grips with 
their present world,  a world where there is nowhere to camp in town. Behind the public images 
of social problems there are whole communities of people who are invisible.  
I should add that the incident evoked a great deal of laughter later out at Bulman, my 
putative son's stagger and my alarm being replayed repeatedly for the entertainment of the whole 
camp. 
Culturally embarrassing encounters have been happening for ever. Let me just relate one 
from the past. The scene is the 1960s at Mainoru station in southern Arnhem Land where a 
familiar visitor, who claimed friendship and goodwill towards the Rembarrnga people, wanted to 
take photos. He insisted that Larry stand next to his sister, and, as most of you will recognise, 
this contravenes an avoidance practice. His daughter described the incident many years later: 
 
When that bloke said come close to Florry, my father just bolted like he got electric shock. 
He never had anything to do with white people after that. If mununga came he’d be gone 
(Annette Murray pers.com. 1993). 
 
The photographer's action was not just as an innocent, careless lack of information, but an 
active overriding of Larry and his daughter's wishes, in the name of benign friendship.8 To him 
avoidance practices were meaningless or uncivilised and so he intruded on a highly emotional 
and intimate arena of interpersonal relations and tried to force them to do things that were 
                                                 
8  This does not mean that either Larry or any other of the Rembarrnga people at Mainoru were hostile to the station 
owners. When I first visited Bulman and ever since I have been hearing stories of the family who were co-residents 
there, the owners in whitefella terms, the Mackay family. My own convictions and knowledge told me that these 
people exploited Aboriginal labour, and in a technical sense they did. But if they did, the Rembarrnga people did not 
see it like that. Cultural embarrassment was only one element of a world of rich experiences which were recounted 





heretical or obscene. Thus I am suggesting there is a responsibility to know those who we want 
to interact with, or to do good to, or to govern. 
Aboriginal people have learned to either avoid, or cope with, cultural embarrassment — 
for instance in schools where their kinship categories are contradicted by school authorities. 
The examples I have given all involve kinship, and Aboriginal people are having to adjust 
to the eroded significance of kin relatedness which is the mark of modern society. Those who 
live in towns may feel liberated from the strict rules of kinship, and may choose to get away 
from the legitimate demands of relatives — from humbug — and such motives are only too well 
recognised and applauded by whitefellas. Why is this the case? Are we no longer able to take 
pleasure in extended families. Or is it that an army of kinsfolk are difficult to cope with in 
suburban homes. I find it interesting how offended people are by the extent and significance of 
the obligations and interpersonal responsibilities which Aborigines accept as part of their 
relationships. 
 
C PLEASURE IN DIFFERENCE? 
In my abstract I promised to talk about the pleasures in difference. It surprises me how 
few documented examples there are, either here or elsewhere. Most commonly difference seems 
only to be appreciated when it is domesticated and consumable, as in exotic food or music. Why 
do many differences make us feel uncomfortable, guilty or afraid? I quote a paragraph from my 
new book:  
 
'While sophisticated citizens take pride in the appreciation of elements of exotic culture, 
and deference to difference is automatic among cosmopolitan urbanites, it is always 
understood that some things are beyond the pale. The conventional admiration of exotic 
and spiritual Indigenous worlds has been disturbed by recent revelations of Indigenous 
differences that are labelled unhealthy, chaotic, or cruel.' (Blackfellas Whitefellas and the 
Hidden Injuries of Race: Ch. 9) 
 
 Common anxieties about present dangers — the fear of others, and of our own shameful 
impulses or ignorance —  themselves suggest the possibility of other ways of proceeding. After 
all, there are two sides of Australia's blemished history; the past is a burden we can share with 
Indigenous people. I will finish by quoting Nelly Camfoo, a Rembarrnga woman and I think we 
can all take pleasure in her sharp sense of difference, and her kind of exasperated acceptance of 
the conditions of existance in this mununga, (whitefella) world. She is talking about the elections 
and saying 'We don't vote for anyone', in our way. 
I will vote but I’ll never win. That’s white law. We just vote, we don’t get anything out of 
it. I can vote for some bloke, but maybe I’m voting for a bad man who will bring war to 
Arnhem Land. I vote because I’m in mununga country now. If I don’t vote, poor old lubra 
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me, I’ll get a summons letter, and I’m fined fifty dollar or whatever it is. And if I don’t pay 
I’ll go to gaol. That’s your mununga rule. So I have to vote while I'm here wearing your 
clothes and talking your English and smoking your tobacco, eating your sugar and tea, and 
talking to your tape recorder. It’s not the blackfella way! 
We just had a letter stick us mob. And for Toyota, we had our foot. 
 
 Both whitefellas and blackfellas express the same kinds of nostalgia for a better past and worries 
about a worse future. By recognising and naming the hypocricies and horrors of continuing, 
unnamed, racial inequality we may begin to overcome them. Perhaps we can invert the pervasive 
moralism through which we affirm our own belonging, and refuse meaning to encounters with 
others. Difference may then become interesting, productive, elating and a source of expanded 
possibilities. 
 
 
